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This is the second edition of a popular casebook which made its initial ap-
pearance only in 1946. A new edition is not only justified, but has been made
necessary, by the number of important cases which have since appeared and
by the adoption by Congress of a new Title 28 of the United States Code in
complete substitution for the old Judicial Code. That material on federal
procedure becomes out of date thus rapidly is in itself a commentary on the
present status of the American attempt to maintain two systems of courts,
operating in the same territory at the same time, owing distinct and conflicting
allegiances to different sovereigns. But that is the essence of federalism; and
we, servitors of the system, can only give thanks that we are accorded tools
thus apt for an understanding of the problems, even if "their alleviation is ap-
parently too much to be hoped for.
Basically, of course, this edition builds. upon the firm foundation of the
earlier edition. Since the reviewer has already expressed his warm approval
of that work,' there is little occasion to add details of praise here. He has
had the opportunity of making the final test of a casebook, that of classroom
use, as afforded by a couple of summers of teaching by way of busman's holi-
day; and he has found the new edition even more stimulating than the old.
Indeed, the more complex the subject becomes, the more interesting for the
teacher; and the new cases, both those based on the new Code and those in-
volving refinements of earlier difficulties, provide fruitful subjects for class-
room discussion and analysis. However much one may decry the increasing
conflicts of federal jurisdiction, they do provide at least that stimulus to the
student and scholar.
In a subject such as this, there must always be a major problem how much
sheer history should be presented as against a concentration upon the judicial
trends of the moment. I have only admiration for the way in which the editors
have met this issue. They have not skimped history, but have always kept
their sights upon the present law. What makes a course from this book ex-
citing is that it is thus up to the minute. We see where we have come from and
where we are; and we can pause for a moment before plunging into the abyss of
the future. That surely makes for vital interest. Perhaps the only unsuccessful
part is that devoted to Procedure in the District Court, an attempt to set
forth the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against the background of juris-
dictional problems. The editors devoted extensive revision to this lengthy
part; even so it gives only a sketchy view of the procedure while isolating such
problems as venue-made even more important by the new Code-from the
questions of jurisdiction proper with which they are intimately associated.
Preferably it would seem that this material should have been rigorously re-
stricted, since the pleading rules are not, and never have properly been, ex-
clusively federal; and those parts still retained could well have been dis-
tributed among the jurisdictional topics proper. For federal jurisdiction is
enough of a course by itself! And I could wish that the editors had followed
their own advice to students and had made direct use of the admirable judicial
statistics of the Administrative Office, to give proper perspective to an evalu-
ation of the importance of various types of federal court business These
1 55 YALE L. J. 853 (1946).
2 See, e.g., 1949 Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 71-113; Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CoN an'. PROB. 201 (1948);
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are, of course, but minor suggestions as to a work whose general success is
obvious. I turn now to a matter of greater importance, one with which doubt-
less the editors have struggled. That has to do with the manifest deterioration
of federal procedure to its present state of a collection of conflicting and in-
decisive retreats from judicial action, and the question whether a casebook
or a law school course can do anything about it.
In the preface to their first edition the editors called for a bold and forth-
right attack upon the problem of simplification and rationalization of the
federal practice. Even then this reviewer expressed some regret that the edi-
tors had not pushed their point somewhat more strongly in their textual ma-
terials. Perhaps this was a vain counsel; obviously casebook editors cannot
go far in this regard at best, and teachers often object to any such attempts,
particularly if the attempts are at variance with their own views. At any
rate the editors have now retreated yet more to the calm peace of the scholar
and do not now even express a hope of improvement for the future. One can
sympathize with them; that so much of devoted effort by so many between
the dates of the two editions should not even have matched the Red Queen's
success in running sufficiently hard to keep abreast of the status quo suggests a
situation verging on the hopeless. For it must be admitted, as a comparison
of the two volumes shows, that the inconsistencies and confusions of federal
practice are on the increase.
There are two major grounds for this pessimism. One concerns the new
Code of 1948. That has received high praise, partly induced by surprise at
a code at all, partly stimulated by concentration upon a few definite reforms.
True, the adoption of a code was an achievement, for all previous attempts
at revision had failed since that of 1911. But nolT the time has come for a
more objective judgment. An increasing number of cases has already disclosed
difficulties which range all the way from definite errors3 (some, but by no means
all, corrected or reprojected in the amendatory act of 1949) through not too
well-conceived or executed reforms 4 to some strange modesty or reluctance in
the face of other substantial problems. 5 True, some gains are to be noted; but
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, id. at 216; and
compare Professor Atkinson's similar criticism in 25 N. Y. U. L. REv. 439, 440 (1950).
3 See, e.g., Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1950), dealing with the
omission of acts still important in admiralty; or, e.g., the continuance of a statute such
as 28 U. S. C. § 1693, notwithstanding Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S.
438 (1946).
4 Cases such as American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 181 F. 2d 845 (5th Cir. 1950)
(the "separate cause of action" in the removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1441), or Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950) ("might have been brought" in the
change-of-venue statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1404), if they do not suggest doubts whether the
courts are correctly interpreting those reform purposes which the revisers did pursue,
do disclose ambiguities of expression in the product. The first matter is discussed in Wills
and Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9 OHio ST.
L. J. 257 (1948), several valuable law review comments, including 44 IL. L. REv. 397
(1949), 33 MmNN. L. REv. 738 (1949), 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 80 (1949), and MooRE's CoM-
MENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 91, 248-252 (1949). The second matter is con-
sidered in district court cases reversed or overruled by the Foster-Milburn case, McCarley
v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 43 (W. D. N. Y. 1950); Ferguson v. Ford Motor
Co., 89 F. Supp. 45 (S. D. N. Y. 1950); and see also Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HAmv. L. RaV. 908, 934 (1947), and Wechsler, supra note 2, at 222, 235.
5 Perhaps it was too much to expect a thoroughgoing reconsideration of such major
topics as federal-question and diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction (compare Wechsler,
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there must now be definite concern lest more problems have been created than
solved.6 Most disconcerting of all is the obvious fact that a promising reform
movement has completely exhausted itself in what at best is only tinkering
with a creaking structure.
The other factor of concern is the increasing tempo of the movement which
perhaps became inevitable with the announcement of the opinion in Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins. Before 1938 the federal courts were supposed to take mbst of
their procedure from the states, together, however, with a goodly share of
substantive law from the national government. Of course that year marks the
great reversal; with the exciting reform of a new and uniform system of pro-
cedure came the mandate, applied with increasing rigidity, that all substantive((common law" must come from the states--except for that nebulous, but also
strangely increasing, branch, "federal common law."7 There is not sharp
enough dichotomy between substance and procedure so that these terms can
be rigorously self-applying in any event. As it happened, however, the announce-
ment of the rather natural conclusion from the adopted premise that any pro-
cedure which "significantly" affects the result of the litigation must be gov-
erned by the state practice has led directly-and particularly after the three
cases in June 1949 enforcing the rule with drastic logic-to the present situ-
ation where hardly a one of the heralded Federal Rules can be considered safe
from attack by shrewd lawyers and obedient lower tribunals.8  The remedies
supra note 2), though the developments of the Erie doctrine discussed below in the text
may suggest the need of more than decisional attack on that problem. The matters referred
to in footnotes 3-6 are samplings which indicate the unusual mixture of caution with even
venturesome rashness to be found throughout the revision.
6 Even such a desirable reform as the change-of-venue provision, supra note 4, has
raised extensive problems not only of meaning, but also of application, so much so that,
as the reported cases show, much of the time of district judges in New York (and of
appellate judges on some perhaps doubtful form of interlocutory appeal or mandamus)
is now being taken up with lengthy consideration of whether or not they should hear
the cases brought before them. So, too, such a desirable reform as that clarifying and
extending "pendent jurisdiction" in patent, copyright, and trademark cases, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1338(b), is rendered confused by the Reviser's Note; compare reasoned discussion in
Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 89 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn. 1950), approved in a note
in 36 VA. L. REv. 545 (1950).
7 See, e.g., Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law,
59 HAThv. L. REv. 966 (1946), and MooRE's CoNMEENTARY ON VIE U. S. JUDxICrM CODE
340-346 (1949), as well as the writer's article, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAa; L. J. 267 (1946). As I there
pointed out, there was a desirable middle ground between the rigid limits of either the
pre- or post-Erie rule, which had been shown by the Supreme Court, notably in decisions
by Mr. Justice Cardozo. 55 YALE L. J. 267, at 276, 295, 296.
8 Thus, see Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan--A Trple Play on the Federal Rules, 3
VANDEnRiLT L. REv. 711 (1950), and Federal Procedure---"Outcome" Test Applied in
Actions Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 35 CoaN=. L. Q. 420 (1950). The point is also
pressed with vigor in Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L. J. 1 (1949),
21 OxL. B. A. J. 619 (1950), and Keeffe, Gilooley, Bailey and Day, Weary Erie, 34
CoRNELL L. Q. 494 (1949). The cases included in the title of the first article cited com-
prise, of course, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945), stating the
"outcome" test, and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530
(1949), applying it to the "commencement of the action" and its effect on the statute
of limitations. See also Denny, Substance, Procedure and Uniformity-Recent Extensions
of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 38 GEo. L. J. 115 (1949), and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and
the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1030 (1949).
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now suggested seem fully as bad as the malady: state and apply the rule only
in terms of "forum-shopping," of course between state and federal courts, while
overlooking that between federal districts; abolish the uniform Rules in di-
versity cases (but what about shopping, too, with federal question cases?); or
possibly more sensible, merely hope for an inevitable reaction from the present
low point.0
Is it not a reflection upon our legal genius that nearly two centuries of at-
tempt to operate a federal system can give us only this? Particularly disappcint-
ing is the realization that what we are bound to is the worst part of the system,
that by a sort of Gresham's Law,'0 judicial administration must adapt itself
to the least effective state practice. For, as one commentator has pointed out, the
present situation would seem to be that only where the federal procedure is more
restrictive than that of a state can it be safely followed; wherever the state
procedure is the more illiberal, it appears to be the one necessarily to be ap-
plied.:" There is 'irony in the fact that while states have been turning more
and more to the federal system for their own use-witness, just lately, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Utah-the federal courts are being forced
more and more back to a conformity more rigid, as well as more uncertain,
than that required by the Conformity Act of 1872, of dubibus memory. One
may wonder whether there is all this fear of federal judicial aggression upon
the part of our citizenry; one may perhaps harbor the thought that the judges,
alone of all governmental agencies, are pursuing a quixotic gleam at terrible
price in waste effort and confusion and delay which can hardly succeed over
the years, so contrary is it to all other trends of the times. It does seem that a
reaction is bound to come. But there is little sign that it is near at hand;
rather within another four years the editors will doubtless need to produce a
new edition setting forth yet more jurisdictional confusions to the edification
of the teacher and the student and the distress of the procedural reformer, to
say nothing of the litigants. When they come to comply with this reimpending
need, I suggest to these scholars, recognized as men of ideas and vision, that
they consider a warmer attack upon some of the preconceptions, nay illusions,




9The first is stated in Horowitz, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine Those
Rules of State Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CALin. L. REv. 204, 215 (1950);
the second is that of Merrigan, supra note 8; while the third is that of the comment, 35
CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), supra note 8. The views of judge Parker in Erie v. Tompkins
in Retrospect: Ag Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A. B. A. J. 19 (1949),
and of Professor MooaE, Coicm:xNTARY ON T=E U. S. JUDICiAL CODE 359 (1949), are op-
posed to those of the other commentators cited and seem overhopeful; thus Professor
Moore's limited list of still surviving federal rules, id. at 320, says more even than these
commentators.
10 I have discussed this procedural phenomenon elsewhere, as in Special Problems in
Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VANw. L. REV. 493, 498, 505
(1950).
1 35 CORNELL L. Q. 420 (1950), supra note 8.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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